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Esteemed British colleagues: 
1. 1 thank you very much for your invitation and for the opportunity 
you have given me to be with you today and to reflect on our 
profession. 
Countries and the times generate catchwords that at a given 
moment are widely used, occasionally without knowing the why or 
wherefore. One of them that is currently very popular is "de- 
regulation", a word that is becoming a symbol of confrontation wi 
governamental interventionism. It was first utilised in the Unit- 
ed States when that nation decided to "find itself" and update 
its industrial and financia1 institutions. It has passed on to 
Great Britain, and it is nau entering the rest of Europe, with a 
goal of economic liberalisation that is not always precisely 
adhered to. 
The original subject of this talk, "self-regulation", seemed too 
limited to me, so 1 chose to change it to "deregulation". When 1 
began preparing it, 1 also thought that this word was limited. 
Therefore, I'm going to speak "openly", in order to say what 1 
think, mainly regarding the legal aspects of insurance, with some 
closing rernarks on Spanish insurance legislation, which is 
assuredly underyoing upheaval. 
In a certain way, there is a resemblance between the terrns "de- 
regulation", "self-regulation", "divesture" and simply "freedom". 
Dereyulation is a tendency to eliminate administrative restrict- 
ions on economic activity, which favours some companies, although 
it might limit their freedom. Self-regulation is the creation of 
interna1 standards of self-control by individual businesses or 
business associations, mainly in regard to solvency and quality 
of service, avoiding a "regulation dynamics" on the part of the 
yovernment. London is an example of the "tendency toward self- 
regulation", although in some ways this is now a questionable 
assumption. On the other hand, the Continent and the United 
States are examples of "regulation", as is my country. 
Divesture is also related to this "movement". In Great Britain it 
has given rise to the denationalisation of large businesses, and 
in the United States, to the breaking up of inherent monopolies - 
sucki as the famous case of ATT - in order to promote coinpetition. 
On a personal level, let me say that MAPFRE itself is carryiny 
out a "divesture" plan, which we cal1 MAPFRE System/85, with the 
total separation of its activities in three main areas (Life, 
Automobile and General ~nsurance/~einsurance) without common 
services, subject only to budget and auditing control and to 
minor procedural restrictions; thus we will cease being a "yroup" 
in order to become a "yalaxy" in some way like Japanese 
Zaitbatsu. 
As you will see, the three terms converge into two objectives: 
the search for "freedom" in economic activity, and the eliminat- 
ion of a bureaucracy that destroys tne vitality of businesses, 
changing corporations into simple "dinosaurs". 
11. The subject of "deregulation" is political inasmuch as it affects 
the dynamics of social structure; it is economic inasmuch as the 
oalanced development o£ national wealtli and the creation of 
powerful lnstruments o£ economic manayement aapend on it; and it 
is sociological inasi,~uch as it affects the organisation and 
structure of social life. It is also juridical, and you are the 
jurists who - taking into account tlie social reality and niajor 
political tendencies o£ a country - inust construct the "legal 
principles" of our institution, not merely the administrative 
standards that Government officers proauce. In this regard, 1 
must point out the permanent present and future uncertainty 
within the Anglosaxon concept of law, which ties in with Roman 
law in its permanent "social" construction stemrning from custom 
and jurisprudence, and the Continental concept, partly of German- 
ic origin and expanded in the Napoleonic Code, "regulatory", with 
detailed standards for activities of a particularly economic 
nature. Both "aeregulation" and "self-regulation" are pro-Anglo- 
saxon and anti-Continental reactions. 
Regarding the political aspect, "deregulation" represents a 
reaction against statism, whether it comes from Marxist-influenc- 
ed ideology or from the natural pragmatic result ot bureaucrats 
having aspired toward "more power" and "wider influence" through- 
out al1 times, al1 governments, and definitely al1 countries. 
In an "intuitive-trascendental" way, "deregulation" recoynises 
the great effort necessary to confront the problems of the free 
rnan, that could be specially fruitful if it utilises individual 
eneryy without any interference. It. signifies a shift of social 
responsibility from fhe government's heavy and rigid apparatus to 
society as a whole, allowing many more people to become "decision 
makers" than in a centralised system. Even though it may s,eem 
paradoxical, this increases governmental authority, while 
paralysed statism reduces it, owing to the weight of the bureau- 
cratic load and its interna1 strugyles contrary to the general 
interests o£ society. 
"Deregulation' is to a large extent identified witn "debureau- 
cratisation" which, by its riyidity, hinders adaptation to new 
needs, especially important in an age of "dizzying change". "De- 
r egu l a t i on" ,  with i t s  pos s ib l e  l i m i t s  and t h e  problerns it may 
cause, is a syniptom, and i n  a c e r t a i n  way a symbol, of freedom 
tkiat always imglles  r i s k  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  So t n a t  t h i s  freedom 
rnay De exerc i sed ,  a l e g a l  system is c a l l e d  f o r ,  not only "regul- 
a t ior is"  t h a t  genera l ly  a r e  a n t i - j u r i d i c a l ,  a s  we l l  a s  an e f f e c t -  
i v e ,  independent, and competent Court system an indispensable  
i t e m  i n  order  t o  reacn t he  h ighes t  pJane of freedom compatible 
with prudence. There ' s  nothing s t r ange  about some novice d i c t a t o r  
- even i n  a formally democratic system - t r y i n g  t o  accornodate, 
weaken, buy ou t  and subjugate j u d i c i a l  power. 
I n  s t r i c t l y  economic terms, "deregula t ion"  i s  a p o s i t i v e  f a c t o r ,  
because it r e a c t i v a t e s  t h e  t o o l s  f o r  t h e  c r ea t i on  of weal th,  
sh i e ld ing  t h e m  from p r i v i l e g e s  o r  de f a c t o  o l i gopo l i e s ,  and 
fo r ce s  them t o  focus on t h e i r  own goal  of s o c i a l  improvement and 
inc rease  o£ wealth,  a dec i s i ve  a c t  i n  order  t o  confront  t h e  
genera l i sed  demand f o r  g r e a t e r  purchasing power. 
"Deregulation" has s p e c i a l  importance when new a r ea s  of competit- 
ion a r i s e ,  such a s  with t h e  "un ive r sa l i s a t i on"  of the c i r c u l a t i o n  
of c a p i t a l  and of t h e  (manual and i n t e l l e c t u a l )  labour force ,  
which does no t  need t o  migrate  i n  o rder  t o  break i n t o  t h e  market- 
p lace  wi th  products  c r ea t ed  a t  a reduced labour cos t  and a l s o  - 
even though it may shame u s  - under managerial and o rgan i s a t i ona l  
systems t h a t  a r e  more e f f i c i e n t  than those  we have es tab l i shed  i n  
western s o c i e t y .  
I n  soc io log i ca l  terms, t h e  consequences of "deregula t ion"  a r e  not 
a s  p o s i t i v e ,  s i n c e  they impose systems of "unlimited s o c i a l  
f r i c t i o n "  by which each year one must reaccomplish the  gains of 
tiie previous year and oy which, i n  a p leasan t  o r  harsh fashion,  
everyone is permanently aga in s t  everyone e l s e .  Whatever t he  
yovernment, humanity i s  always i n  a debate between continuous 
dynamic a c t i o n  and ' h e a r t f e l t  a s p i r a t i o n s  t o  t h e  s t a t u s  quo, t o  
preserving what it has ,  and t o  "keeping o the r s  from keeping us 
from r e s t i n g "  aqd not  l e t t i n g  tnem p lace  our image and phys ica l  
o r  s o c i a l  h e r i t a g e  i n  danyer. The balance po in t ,  when it is  
a t t a i n e d ,  al lows a country t o  prosper and e l eva t e  i t s e l f  above 
i t s  r i v a l s .  
Neither  is "continous movement" v iab le  here .  F r i c t i o n  from a c t i v e  
and pass ive  fo r ce s  h inders  market competit ion and the con t inu i t y  
of r evo lu t ions .  Tnis no douot i n sp i r ed  Mao's tneory  of t h e  
"permanent i n t e r n a 1  revo lu t ion"  w i t h  t h e  "Cul tu ra l  Revolution" a s  
an  example, an undertaking more t i t a n i c  than any o the r  i n  t h e  
f r e e  world, because t h e r e  is nothing a s  conservat ive  a s  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  r evo lu t i ona r i e s  c r e a t e .  
T h i s  i s  no t  t h e  moment t o  fol low these  d iy ress ions ,  though 
n e i t h e r  would it be proper t o  avoid them. We can only do best 
what we have t o  do, o r  what w e  can do, i f  w e  delve end less ly  i n t o  
t h e  phenomena of human l i f e ,  and most e spec i a l l y  i n t o  those of a 
genera l  na tu re  t h a t  can he lp  us a t t a i n  a "pragmatic p0 l i cy  i n  
o rder  t o  a s p i r e  toward a humble fu tu r e " .  
111. Regarding insurance in the United States, the country tiiat creat- 
ed the concept, "deregulation" mainly affects tkie banking indust- 
rY, both witn important repercussions fur insurance, as indirect 
as they may De, except for a yreater ease in recent years in 
linking life and yeneral insurance firms. The liberalising o£ the 
banking industry facilitates its multi-implantation and its 
relationships with other financia1 institutions, such as insur- 
arice. This can have an economic impact, since insurance companies 
and ban~ers are going to be submitted to influence and reciprocal 
interference by dint o£ the following: "savings products" with 
objectives that in some degree are similar to those of life 
assurance; increased shareholder exchange between companies of 
one kind or another, and especially the mutual utilisation o£ 
territorial networks. 
Because of this, one important aspect for insurance companies is 
the repercussion that is going to take place in the distribution 
of new services precisely at a moment when the boundaries between 
central and territorial activities are becoming blurred. 
Al1 of this, aided by advances in data processiny, opens up 
completely new horizons to insurance companies, either in a 
positive or negative sense, that to some degree will have 
repercussions of a differerit sort in every European country, 
owing to its current institutional situation. At any rate, an 
alternative is going to be posed, one which 1 have often been 
asked about. Which is preferable for an insurance or bankiny 
oryanisation, to go into "foreign territory" and consolidate its 
activity and its operatiny insurance networks and financia1 
sphere, or to remain nighly specialised in its own area, as 
insurance or banking professionals, concentratiny its efforts in 
order to offer the best service at the lowest cost? I'm not a 
Danker, and 1 can't answer on their behalf, but as an insurance 
man my opinion is clearly on the side of superspecialisation, 
which reveals details that are not evident to those who do 
"package" work, even within the insurance business itself. 
Therefore, networks highly-specialized in efficient and 
sophisticated service will spring up, ones that will compete very 
favourably with the "complex service networks". In the possible - 
1 don't know whether probable - "new, unlimited Europe", the 
"distribution revolution" will be decisive. It can cnange our 
professional outlook, although 1 don't believe this will happen 
soon. 
1 think that Great Britain finds itself in a different situation. 
Its strength in many institutions and in insurance has been 
through "self-regulation"; now, as a result of scandals in its 
"international reinsurance rnarket" and of legislation by the EEC, 
it is being affected by "regulation" in areas that it had 
previously avoided. But tnis forms part of a process o£ adaptat- 
ion that is golny to put aii end to habits wa have al1 acquired; 
in sorne cases it will 'hurt us, and its effects are not always 
iiomogeneous. For example, freedon of services benefits British 
insurance companies, thouyh to gain tiiis they may have to do 
business in life assurance with specialised firms. 
In Europe, important structural chanyes must be foreseen as a 
conse uence o£ the absorption of insurance companies by those of 
a difqerent country, and especiallr by 'non-insurance" businesses 
and organisations. In this regard, 1 think that the socio-politic- 
al balance of a country advises that most part of its leadiny 
insurance companies be national, and that their decision-making 
affecting their policyholders be carried out inside the country, 
freely and without compulsion or protectionism, wnich is only 
justified - definitrly here - in small, p w r  countries, although 
some of them misht bemoan the fact that limits have been ulaced 
- - 
interests, some contradictory to the policy601ders' interests, a 
situation that generally impedes manayement both of state-owned 
concerns and of those dependent on a different managerial 
sector. 
A "deregulatea" government does not allow intervention in these 
two areas, which could be a negative factor, above al1 in the 
development o£ countries of modest means. Among those of "some 
importance", as 1 consider mine to be, legal discrimination is 
not justified, thouyh an overwhelming foreiyn invasion could 
produce an imbalance. Therefore, the existence of insurance comp- 
anies that cannot be mariipulated from abroad, either by rnultinat- 
ional groups or by other manayerial activities, is "positive". 
This has been a conscientious objective during my almost fhirty 
years as a MAPFRE General Manager, which has attained asizeable 
importance by Spanish standards, and whose totality is fully 
controlled by MAPFRE Mutual Insurance, who always holds - 
directly or indirectly - ownership o£ more than 50% of the stock 
in al1 the companies under our name, as a result o£ which it will 
never be dependent on anyone outside of Spain or outside o£ the 
insurance business. 
This type of orientation, which must not be limited to a mutual 
structure, will arise toyether with insurance companies of a co- 
operative or institutional nature or ownership that will proyress 
more than theircompetitors. 1 label this phenomenon "institut- 
ionalisation", a gradual consequence of market evolution, in 
which the responsible public "votes" by its insurance decisions, 
and tends toward those who offer more guarantees of "responsible 
and independent continuity", drawing nearer to those who - 
pernaps due to their origin, or their "business culture", or 
their will - identify best with the problems and evolving needs 
o£ individual policyholders. 
In this reyard, 1 want to point out the importance o£ the figure 
o£ the "leading insurance company" and the "institutional insur- 
ance company" in the national marketplace. The leader is one who 
influences a national marKetylace by its decisions and guide- 
lines, as a whole or in part, owin~j to its share of the market, 
or its special dimension in one branch or in a yeoyraphical 
area. 
The institutional coinpany is one that has acnieved stability ana 
general recognition, owing to its conditions o£ ownership, its 
long-term existence, ana its influence on society, leaaing it to 
be considered as an unalterable, nonmanipulatable, and organic 
part of economic and social life. It is difficult for a foreign 
insurance company to ue institutional, since one almost inevit- 
able requirement for this consideration is that decisions be 
implemented within the country and not outside o£ it. 
The concepts o£ institutional and leading insurance cornpanies are 
normally mixed together; both are important in this context of 
"deregulation". For legal or simply de facto reasons, many 
legislatures favour larye insurance companies. "Deregulation" 
causes them to lose privileges and offers them no protection, 
though it does not attack, but rather defends them, staving off 
their paralysis, their transformation into dinosaurs that with 
their neyative influence reduce market efficiency and harm the 
policyholders. 
Protection o£ the public in our institution and others like it is 
achieved by a balance between the desired flow o£ institutional- 
isation and the spur of competition; Chis keebs one from resting 
on his laurels or suborddinating public interest to the comfort 
or selfishness o£ business and its leaders. It o£ course must not 
be an exact science, but rather the natural consequence of a 
nealthy, well-balanced social life that can react quickly in 
cases of abuse o£ power, and anticipate them as much as 
possible . 
If a market without the stability and influence of institutional 
and leading insurance companies is unsatisfactory, so much more 
is the case when it is "controlled" by them as they rest on their 
power, which hinders the defence of general interests by doininat- 
ing associations, influencing public authority and, in snort, 
abusing their "strength". Therefore, governmental insurance comp- 
anies can be especially "negative' in our institution, because 
institutional power itself is "amassed" with the power of the 
state which is their owner. 
IV. In keeping with this forum and my audience Iiere, I'd like to 
refer to the influence o£ "deregulation" on insurance law, to 
which it should bring a breath of fresh air as a renovating 
factor, developing an institutional law yoing beyond "comercial 
law" that has, up ti11 now, been dominant in the area of insur- 
ance relations. This is a challenge for those of you in London 
who could be "leaders" in legal insurance matters within a 
humanity undergoing the greatest amount o£ interaction in its 
history. 
Tne true goal of "deregulation" is to defeat the yreat'two-headed 
hydra of bureaucracy: tne Government, which aspires to regulate 
al1 activity meticulously, and that part which the big insurance 
companies have for some time been creating while relying on their 
preferential market situation. 
Of course, both heads yet alony splendidly, negotiating their 
respective spheres of "influence and power" at the cost oi 
service to clients and public. 1n oraer that this qpal be 
possible, two factors that conuition a tneoretlcal, un lmited 
ireedom are necessary: 
- Contractual insurance law built on a uasis of experience and, 
as muc'h as uossible, on i'urisprudence; insvired by the search 
for f airness in contractuai relátions between polic;holders and 
insurance companies, and with protection o£ the weakest. 
- Insurance company solvency, withouth which the insurance contr- 
act is nothing uut a gambler's tarce whareby the policyholder 
always pays in advance, and the insurance company only pays if 
he's lucky. 
But "deregulation" as a dynamic current has its limits. The world 
is not a cjlobe of pure oxygen in which al1 kinds o£ experiments 
are possible. Our reality is extremely imperfect, impure, 1 fear, 
to a great extent. That is precisely why laboratory experiments 
that tyrants, ideologists, or revolutionaries sornetimes wish to 
submit us to, end in failure. The pure Cambodian communism only 
led to an immense bloodbath; by tñe same token, experiments by 
the foolish economists of "absolute economic freedom" have had 
disastrous results, as we have recently seen in Latin America. 
If a social group is not completely "deregulated" (1 don't dare 
suppose what would happen if it were), it is absurd to strive for 
total freedom only in one sector. British, Spanish, European, and 
world-wide insurance - especially that of the smaller countries - 
clearly exists in a well-regulated society, in which each part 
relies on the others, and where an isolated experiment cannot go 
very far. In many cases, regulation is a social necessity 
exacerbated by the reduced dimensions of the community itself. 
A great power like the United States, with an enormous advantage 
owing to its "combination o£ technological development and 
economic latitude", can undertake experiments that fail in other 
countries. In the long run, "deregulation" of the airlines and 
telephone systems seems very positive, though of course this 
causes problems and intermediate victims. However, in Spain some 
of these attempts would e simply impossible; even in your 
country, the "deregulation" of the London Stock Exchange is 
presentiny more problems than were foreseen, and there are those 
who doubt that it can be completely carried out. 
Besides the elimination of national administrative reyulations 
and the disappearance of minimurn rates, the "dereyulation" of 
insurance implies the shattering o£ institutional and political 
boundaries, in a true "extraterritorial explosion" of an activity 
that, Que to its dynamics and intrinsic needs,' tends toward an 
international diffusion. 
1s tne complete freedom of al1 European insurance activities 
foreseeable in the near future? Will the interna1 forces o£ each 
nation consent to it? Can any country, especially the small .and 
insecure  ones, t h e o r e t i c a l l y  allow an a c t i v i t y  a s  s o c i a l l y  
inyra ined a s  i s  insurance t o  depend upon far-off  coun t r i e s  whose 
u l t ima te  motives a r e  t o t a l l y  a l i e n  t o  t h e i r  na t i ona l  i n t e r e s t s ?  
O r  should n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  not  be allowed t o  e x i s t ?  
1 tnink t h a t  Spanish insurance has  been adequately irnmunised 
aya in s t  t h i s  danyer, ~ u t  should t h i s  d e s i r a b l e  na t i ve  l eadersh ip  
become lost  with abso lu te  f r e e  competit ion, poss ib ly  some s o r t  of 
pub l i c  p r e s su re  would a r i s e  i n  order  t o  avoid it, o r  na t i ona l i s -  
a t i o n ,  a s  has  a l ready happeried i n  France and Portugal .  
Thereiore,  1 persona l ly  do not  be l i eve  t h a t  European "dereyul- 
a t i o n "  should, wi th in  t he  next few years ,  go much beyond a 
widespread freedom of r a t e s  ana t h e  prudent app l i ca t i on  of EEC 
yu ide l ines ,  bu t  without  t he  disappearance of t h e  various na t i ona l  
insurance d i v i s i o n s ,  nor snould it be pos s ib l e  f o r  a üerman 
insurance company t o  open an o f f i c e  i n  southern France o r  I r e l and  
t h e  same a s  it can i n  Lower Saxony. T h i s  is  t h e  s t r u y g l e  - not  
always hidden - t h a t  is taking p lace  today i n  t he  EEC and whose 
outcome, 1 p r e d i c t ,  w i l l  be a s  1 am po in t ing  out .  Financia1 and 
o t h e r  r egu l a t i ons ,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  modify, a r e  su r e  t o  impede t n a t  
"pure market" i n  our  p rofess ion ,  which a t  one time seemed 
poss ib le .  
1 am occas iona l ly  asked i f  1 f e a r  the "market opening" t h a t  our 
coun t ry ' s  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  Common Market w i l l  b r ing ,  and my answer 
i s  no. For many years  now, t he  main European insurance companies 
have been opera t ing  i n -  Spain, with a g r e a t  dea l  of freedom and 
wi th  no d i sc r imina t ion .  I ' m  a f r a i d  t h a t  many of them a r e  los ing  
money, which is t o  say,  dumping is  t ak ing  p lace  t o  some ex t en t .  
This  has  not ,  f o r  example, kept  those insurance companies t h a t  
a r e  e n t i r e l y  Spanish from developing q u i t e  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  and 
from s u b s t a n t i a l l y  widening t h e i r  sha re  of t h e  market. Should 
Spain be admit ted next year  i n t o  your community, a r e  Royal, 
Commercial Union, Zurich, Winterthur,  U.A.P.,  A l l i anz ,  General i  
and RAS - who now opera te  i n  our country - going t o  funct ion  any 
d i f f e r e n t l y ?  1 assume t h i s  w i l l  not  happen: a s  of now, t h e i r  
sha re  of t h e  market is shr inking.  The four  l ead ing  Spanish insur-  
ance companies (La Union y e l  Fenix, Catalana,  Mutua Madrileña 
and Mapfre) have gone from a market share  of 14.6% i n  1977 t o  
15.6% i n  1983; t h e  non-Spanisn ones c i t e d  have gone from 11.5% t o  
10.9% during t h e  same per iod.  My compaiiy nas gone from 3.7% i n  
t n i s  same t i m e ,  t o  a probable 5.3.8 i n  1984. 
But i n  s p i t e  of t h e  t a c t  t h a t  na t i ona l ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  insur-  
ance companies a r e  making advances aga in s t  fo re ign  companies, 
s u b s t a n t i a l  changes can t ake  p lace  i n  the  fu tu r e ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  
Spain, s i nce  modi t ica t ions  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of insurance w i l l  not 
come from the evolut ion  of pol icyholders 'wishes ,  but  r a t h e r  from 
t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of na t i ona l  compan~es by fo re ign  companies o r  
o the r  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Years ago, Commercial Union acquired 
important shares  i n  Cont inenta l  insurance,  and today it seems 
t ñ a t  Al l i anz  has  come t o  con t ro l  t n e  l a r g e  I t a l i a n  insurance 
company RAS, and i n  1984 B.A.T. has  made g r e a t  inroads  i n  t h e  
"mu l t i na t i ona l i s a t i on"  process  of B r i t i s h  insurance and maybe 
barikiny . 
In the future, 1 consider the liberalisation of the movernent of 
capital and business investments to be more important than a 
direct implantation; in my opinion, this is the only way a 
European consolidation can corne about. This, on the other hand, 
does not cal1 for EEC standards except in recjard to the inter- 
national transfers of business funds and the possible European- 
isation of investments and monetary backing by insurance conip- 
anies. Once more 1 shall point out the foreseeable importante of 
a mutual or institutional type of insurance company, sucn as 
Norwich Union and Cooperatlve Insurance Society - and many others 
in your country, 1 should think - tliat by their nature will lose 
neither the "rights to their decision-making ability" nor by the 
same token, their independence, as lony as they maintain the 
possibility of absorbing or controlliny other firms. 
V. Following the above observations, 1 shall briefly outline those 
areas of insurance law where 1 foresee changes in the European 
future: 
- Protection against operations that threaten the stability ot an 
insurance company with high assets in order to subordinate it 
to interests outside of insurance, to reduce its liquidity, or 
direct its investments toward speculative ends, an area with 
special repercussion in countries of modest resources who could 
be stripped of their insurance assets and where absolute 
freedom would not be admittable within the society. 
- Maintaining of interna1 static and dynamic solvency by means 
that allow for the detection of managerial errors before they 
affect policyholder's rights, witn greater demands for 
liability - including criminal - on the management of insurance 
f irms, even interfering with the Dehaviour of insurance 
managers in order to authorise a company, something contrary to 
tne sprit of "self-regulation", but which the greater interests 
of the public could advise. 
- Modification of some contractual relations of insurance with 
greater uniformity among countries with common interests and 
greater protection of consumers'interests, lncluding punitive 
measures for those who use legal ploys in order to avoid 
contractual obligations, as is done in the United States. 
- An increase in civil liability of individuals and corporations, 
because even though tiie right o£ liability is independent of 
that of insurance, one must Keep in mind its indirect 
repercussion o11 the public, since each indemnity criterion 
affects the cost of insurance coverage. 
- Greater clarity in relations between invurer and reinsurer, and 
arnong reinsurers tliemselvrs, in instances of reinsurance vis-a- 
vis the policyholder (for example, in determining coverage 
premiums for high risks and when dealing with major accidents), 
in the deter~nination oi currency-exchange differences, and in 
late-payment arrears and settienirnt deductions, al1 pertaining 
to a "private right to reinsurance" of an eminently inter- 
national nature that will facilitate the security and fairness 
of transactions and the precise calculation of assiyned and 
acceptable risk. 
- A precise definitiori of "asency relations" indispensable in the 
insurance and reinsurancr trade, wnicri calls for powers of risk 
acceptance, receipt of funds, and accident settlement. The 
numerous legal cases, precisely in London, that deal with 
ayency relations and subscription iimits confirm this need for 
partial reform as a result of the technoloyical revolution in 
communications aná the current mechanics of reinsurance. 
In which of these areas is "self-reyulatiori" possible, including 
internationally? This is a question that concerns many of us in 
our profession during these times, and it seems likely that it 
will continue to do so. 
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPANISH ILGURANCE LAN 
In recent years, Spanish insurance law has been undergoiny wide- 
spread retorm, to some extent as a consequence of the political 
change that has been takiny place in Spain, thouyh also as a 
consequence of much earlier planning. 1 shall coment on the more 
important aspects . 
1. The regulation o£ insurance contracts was covered in certain 
articles of the Civil and Comercial Law of 1889 and 1885, as 
well as in administrative decrees, until the Insurance 
Contract Law ("Ley de Contrato de Seguro") of 1980 was enact- 
ed, with norms that clearly tend toward the protection o£ 
policyholders as the weakest contracting party, establishinr 
the principle of the primacy of law. This contrasted with the, 
principle of freedom in contractual agreements that prevailed 
earlier, which had left the field open to the "general cond- 
itions" of the insurance policies, often uniform tor the 
entire marltet and subject to prior approval by the Insurance 
Department. This Law nullifies clauses that contradict its 
norms, acceptiny as valid only those tnat are most beneficia1 
to the policyholder. 
In the regulation o£ claims, two changes stand out: the insur- 
er's obliyation to pay the minimum liable amount as compensat- 
ion within forty days of the claim, and a certain form of 
"punitive damages", should compensation not be nade within 
three months following the accident, with an increase -except 
when there is just cause - of 20% per year, in addition to 
normal interest payment for delay. 
The regulation of Bond and Credit insurance is remarkably 
insufficient, with only one article defininy its purpose and 
applying the general norms of the law that in certain cases 
are completely inadequate for this type of insurance. The 
establishment of the ricjht of life policyholders to a 
surrender after two premium annuities, instead of the three 
required in most countries, .is debatable. 
2. Third Party Liability Insurance undergoes a chanye in 1980 
Insurance Contract Law. Article 76 has been labeled "terrible" 
oy a commission of jurists upon determininy that injured 
parties or their heirs can take "direct action against the 
insurer" in order to force compliance with the obligation to 
indemnify, without prejudicing the insurer's riyht to claim 
restitution from the policyholder should the compensable 
damaye or injury be due to fraudulent behaviour on behalf of 
the latter. Ayainst this direct action, the insurer can only 
opgose the exclusive fault of the third party and any point oi 
defense he may have against him. This norm, with precedent in 
the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, led to the prediction 
o£ a dramatic increase in accident claims and costs; three 
years experience has not confirmed this fear. 
The General Law for the Defence of Consumers and Users of 1984 
("Ley General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios") 
has recently had an effect on this insurance, substantially 
modifying the concept of liability outside of the contract 
established in article 1902 of the old Spanish Civil Code, 
cnanging the concept o£ liability by fault to one o£ "risk- 
oriyinated liability" with two practica1 consequences for 
insurers: an important increase in liability for manufactur- 
ers, importers, and sellers or suppliers of goods or services, 
with a hiyher limit of five hundred million pesetas: and an 
important future expansion of the field of liability insur- 
ance, which will be placed on levels similar to those of other 
western nations, naturally with the same problems. 
3. The  "control" of insurance activity was, up ti11 very recent- 
ly, regulated by the Law of 1954, whicn never came to be the 
obiect of a "Realamento". hence a 1912 "Realamento' continued - - 
in effect. At the timé, tnis Law repregented an important 
advance, but for more than the past twenty years the need has 
been felt for a regulation in three main areas: the demand for 
yreater financia1 yuarantees from insurance companies, liber- 
alisation of administrative barriers, and reinforcemerit of the 
authority available to the Insurance Department in cases of 
companies whose condition is unsound or insolvent. 
Since 1974, many bills prepared by the Ministry of Finances, 
have been introduced without the new laws having been enacted. 
When the current Socialist government took office in October 
of 1982, one bill was being debated in Parliarnent; this was 
substituted by another one with no substantial difference, 
that was finally enacted on August 2, 1984. For the most part, 
it is what in Spain is called a "Law of Principles" ("Ley de 
Bases") that must be developed by the Government by means o£ a 
"Reglamento" within one year. 1 shall comment on some o£ its 
important aspects. 
- Increasiny the scope of activiries by reyulatiny, in one 
part, manayerial, representativa or administrative personnel 
withiii the companies cominy under tlie law; professionals who 
subscribe to tlie documenta astabiisheá in tne law: reinsur- 
ance intermeuiaries ana adjusters; in other part, different 
Kinds of "beneiit fands" previously under the control of the 
Laoour Miniatry. 
- Requiriny that companies dealing with life assurance .do not 
nandle other tyges of insurance, though respecting the 
situation o£ tliose who are now operating in al1 branches. 
- Authorising Mutual companies to accept reinsurance. 
- Entitling insurance companies to be Pension Funds administr- 
ators (an area pending legal regulation). 
- Introducing the concept of Insurance Cooperatives with 
regulations similar to those of Mutual Companies, which 
appears to respond more to a concession of a political 
nature than to an actual need. 
- Esta~lishing new minimum capital for insurance firms: five 
hundred million pesetas for professional reinsurers, three 
hundred and twenty million for the area of life insurance, 
a hundred and sixty mlllion £or the remaining branches, and 
lower figures for operating only in certain branches. These 
current and quite prudent figures sharply contrast with tne 
twenty-five million pesetas in the 1954 Law for operating in 
al1 branches. Furthermore, tne law aaheres to the demand for 
a minimum margin of solvency within EEC yuidelines. 
- Definitively eliminating the necessity for prior approval of 
policies and rates for al1 branches, save for initial 
authorisation of the company, retaining the requirernent fhat 
prior notice be yiven to the Insurance Department. Tñis is 
yoing to be very important, being a clear case of "deregul- 
ation" . 
- Inexplicaoly, the law does not contain - as did some of its 
earlier drafts - the obliyation to undergo an audit, nor the 
requirement by the Insurance Department for consolidated 
"financia1 statements" of affiliated companies, although 
these are items that could be developed within the "Reyla- 
mento" o£ the Law on the principles established by the Bank 
of Spain dealing with the requirement of a consolidated 
audit of a prestiyious auditing firm. 
4. Alony with the publication of the Law, a "Roya1 Decree-Law" 
has been enactea that creates a Commission empowered to 
liquidate firms undergoing difficulties, and to advance 
payments to policyholders and accident victims in proportion 
to the assets o£ the insurance company being liquidated. Tne 
Commission can issue bonds that will be underwritten by 
insurance companies; in order to amortise these Wnds and 
finance their expenses of the Commission, a 0.5% surcharge has 
been established for al1 insurance premiums except life. 
Almost a  year  ayo 1 proposed a  more generous formula - whicn 
my ioost i l l u s t r i o u s  col leayues  opposed - i r 1  o rde r  t o  guarantee 
pol icyholders  and vic t ims of c e r t a i n  kinds of acc iden t s  t h a t  
thei r  claims with some l l m i t a t i o n s  would be paid  even when t h e  
insurance company i s  inso lven t .  This would have requirea  a  
surcharye of 1% o r  1 .5%.  I n  my opinion, t h e  formula adopted 
does not  so lve  t h e  s e r i ous  p resen t  problems, and it w i l l  have 
a  neyat ive  repercussion on t h e  fu tu r e  of t h e  Spanish insurance 
~narke t .  
5. The new Insurance Law has  a l s o  introduced some changes i n  
regard t o  insurance  agents ,  and t o r  t h e  f i r s t  time i n  Spain it 
has r egu l a t ea  t n e  a c t i v i t y  of re insurance  agents ,  which u n t i l  
now have no t  been sub j ec t  t o  any s p e c i f i c  l e g a l  provis ions .  
The opera t ion  of insurance agents  was regp la ted  by a  1969 law 
and i t s  1971 "Reglamento" which l im i t ed  t h e  p rofess ion  t o  
i nd iv idua l s .  Now t h e  c r e a t i o n  of companies f o r  t h a t  purpose is 
author ized,  wi th  t h e  requirertient t h a t  tlie manager be an 
"approved agent"  and t h a t  a l 1  of t he  shareholders  be ina iv id-  
ua l s  with no " c o n f l i c t s  of i n t e r e s t s " .  
6 .  In  Spain, insurance a c t i v i t y  is c a r r i e d  out  by p r i v a t e  insur-  
e r s ,  bu t  t h e r e  a r e  some cases  of pub l i c  i n s u r e r s .  The main 
ones a r e  the "EMPRESA NACIONAL DE SEGUROS AGRICOLAS", t h e  
"COMPAflIA ESPflOLA DE CREDITO A LA EXPORTACION" and t h e  
"CONSORCIO DE COMPENSACION DE SEGUROS". The l a t t e r  is a  pub l ic  
insurance i n s t i t u t i o n  on whicn I 1 a  l i k e  t o  comment. Its 
o r i g i n s  go back t o  t h e  Spanish C i v i l  War (1936-19391, which 
produced a  l a rge  number of claims i n  t h e  non-private insurance 
branches, whereas t he  ma j o r i t y  of insurance p o l i c i e s  only 
covered t h e  r i s k  of mutiny o r  popular upr i s ing ,  but  not  war. 
Current ly ,  the Consorcio opera tes  i n  t h r e e  wide areas :  c a t a s -  
t r o p h i c  r i s k  coveraye; insur ing  risks of passengers  using 
pub l i c  t r anspo r t a t i on :  insurance f o r  Government ven ic les  and 
compensation f o r  vict ims of t r a f f i c  acc iden t s  of unknown 
o r i y i n  o r  f o r  insolvency of insurance cornpanies. Present  
surcharges f o r  coverage o t  catastropL;>hic r i s k  o r  proper ty  r i s k s  
vary between t h r e e  per  cerit and f i f t e e n  per  cent  of t n e  
premium according t o  t h e  branch. 
A t  t h i s  time, t h e  opera t ions  o£ t he  Consorcio a r e  under 
thorough review. Recent c a t a s t roph i c  events  t h a t  have taken 
p l ace  i n  my country ( f looding i n  t h e  Basque Country and i n  the  
Southeas t )  have l ed  t o  uncer ta in ty  a s  t o  whetlier c e r t a i n  r i s k s  
were covered o r  not  by t h e  Consorcio. 
On t h e  o the r  harid, s t rony  competion and a  p a r a l l e l  reduct ion 
of premiums f o r  major i n d u s t r i a l  r i s ~ s  t h a t  have taken place  
during r ecen t  years  have a f f e c t e d  t h e  Consorcio 's  income, 
wnich c o n s i s t s  of a surcharye on t h e  premium paid  by pol icy-  
ho lders .  There was even a  chance t h a t  t h e  Consorcio would 
apply t he  r u l e  of average i n  compensating t he  v ic t ims of these  
two y r e a t  ca tas t rophes ,  a l thouyh a t  l a s t ,  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
reasons,  generous compensations were pa id .  
7 .  I n  Spa in ,  L i f e  I n s u r a n c e  h a s  had a very  l i m i t e d  aevelopment.  
I n  1983, L i f e  In su rance  premiuins r e p r e s e n t e d  o n l y  0.23% of t h e  
g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p roduc t ,  v i s - a -v i s  3.46% i n  the Uni ted  Kingdom, 
2.72% i n  t h e  Un i t ed  S t e s  and 2.36% i n  West Germany. A p a r t  o£ 
t h i s  meager development w a s  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  i n su rance  comp- 
a n i e s  themse lves  (h iyh  r a t e s  and inadeyua te  p l a n s  f o r  h i y h  
l e v e l s  of i n f l a t i o n ) ,  b u t  there have been e x t e r n a 1  f a c t o r s ,  
t h e  most impor t an t  b e i n g  a  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  t a x  r e g u l a t i o n  of 
L i f e  In su rance ,  burdened down w i t h  a  5% t a x  on premiums, a 
s i t u a t i o n  that  w i l l  a p p a r e n t l y  be reinedied by t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
i n t o  Spain  of the Value Added Tax, which w i l l ,  it appea r s ,  
exempt t h i s  i n s u r a n c e  from t a x a t i o n .  
There c u r r e n t l y  exis ts  a growing demand f o r  L i f e  In su rance  
t h a t  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  a concern  f o r  some d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s i n g  i n  
government S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y ,  by which r e t i r e m e n t  pens ions  could  
f o r e s e e a b l y  have t o  b e  reduced.  The p a s s i n y  of a l a w  r e g u l a t -  
i n g  Pensiori Funds must have some e f f e c t  on t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  i f  
t h e  r e i t e r a t e d  promises  of the government a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t .  A s  
f a r  a s  is known, t h e i r  management is  r e s e r v e d  f o r  i n su rance  
companies when a de te rmined  l e v e 1  of inves tment  y i e l d  o r  p re -  
de te rmined  c a p i t a l  ha s  been a s su red ,  w i t h  freedom to  c r e a t e  
"manayement companies" f o r  non-insured p u b l i c  funds .  I n  my 
o p i n i o n ,  t h i s  f u t u r e  l a w  w i l l  on ly  have a  s i g n i f i c a i i t  r eper -  
c u s s i o n  i f  the t a x  r e g u l a t i o n  o£ Pension Funds is s a t i s f a c t -  
o r y  and i f  it is  c o o r a i n a t e d  w i t h  an  e x t r a o r á i n a r i l y  complex 
and d i f f i c u l t  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  reform,  which 1 do n o t  s e e  as 
v e r y  p robab le .  
1 thank  al1 of you f o r  your  a t t e n t i o n .  1 o n l y  want t o  add tha t  a s  1 
was p r e p a r i n g  t h i s  t a l k  on d e r e g u l a t i o n ,  1 w a s  s t r o n g l y  reminded of my 
f a t h e r ,  who d i e d  twenty-seven y e a r s  ago, a g r e a t  lawyer and unorthodox 
p o l i t i c i a n  who c o n s i d e r e d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  law t o  be t h e  s o u r c e  of e v i l  
i n  modern s o c i e t y .  A t  the t i m e  1 d i d n ' t  unde r s t and  his  op in ion ,  bu t  1 
t h i n k  i t s  t r a c e  can be found i n  my remarks today,  a s  is  found i n  t h e  
e n t i r e  " d e r e g u l a t i o n "  c u r r e n t  t h a t  is  " invading" t h e  Western s o c i e t y .  
1 t r u s t  you 've  c l e a r l y  unders tood  m e ;  i f  n o t ,  1 aumire  your  p a t i e n c e .  
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